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In two experiments, we explored whether the retrieval processes underlying 
event-based prospective memory can be distinguished from those underlying 
vigilance. Participants performed an ongoing task (either a lexical decision 
task, Experiment 1 and 3, or a categorization task, Experiment 2) while at 
the same time they had to remember to stop performing the ongoing task 
whenever a particular target-stimulus appeared on the computer screen   
(background task). There were two target stimuli, each appearing 4 times 
across the ongoing task. Instructions and training induced participants to 
encode the background task either as a prospective memory task or as a 
vigilance task. Results revealed important processing differences between 
prospective memory and vigilance processes. The time to respond to the 
ongoing task was systematically slower in the vigilance than in the 
prospective memory conditions. However, prospective memory conditions 
did not differ from control (ongoing task only). Accuracy in the background 
task complemented RT data in the ongoing task in that more errors were 
observed in the prospective condition as compared to the vigilance 
condition. The differences were not due to a speed-accuracy trade-off 
between the ongoing and the background tasks, nor to the differences in 
training. Most important, repetition priming was observed across the four 
target presentations in the prospective memory condition but not in the 
vigilance condition. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that event-
based prospective memory and vigilance processes differ as to the degree of 
conscious monitoring that they require, with prospective memory being 
based more on automatic retrieval of the cue-action association and vigilance 
being based more on active search for the target.  
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Remembering to perform an action in the future (prospective memory, 
seeBrandimonte, Einstein, & McDaniel, 1996) has been often considered 
very similar to performing a vigilance task. For example, Meacham and 
Leiman (1982) suggested that over brief retention intervals "remembering to 
carry out an action...may be no different than the problem of maintaining 
one's vigilance" (p. 328). In a similar vein, Baddeley and Wilkins (1984) 
proposed a distinction between short and long-term intentions and suggested 
that short-term intentions may have to be maintained in "conscious 
awareness" during the retention interval in order to be successfully realized. 
However, the realization of longer term intentions may rely on different 
processes as to the degree of conscious monitoring that is required. It seems 
likely that intentions associated with actions that take either a few seconds, 
a few minutes or several hours will undergo different processing 
(Kvavilashvili & Ellis, 1996). For instance, if you have formed the intention 
to call a friend tomorrow evening, probably you will not "think of the 
intention" until the appropriate time approaches. Indeed, for intermediate 
and long-term intentions, conscious awareness may be relevant only during 
the period when the intended action should be retrieved (e.g., the 
performance interval, see Ellis, 1996; McDaniel and Einstein, 1993) or even 
irrelevant if all the parameters of the intended activity are sufficiently 
specified and the action can be realized by automatized routine skills 
(Goschke & Kuhl, 1996). In the latter case, simple actions can be triggered 
by the stimulus itself, without mediation of a conscious recollection of the 
intention (Neumann & Klotz, 1994). This type of readiness of procedural 
action schemas, termed procedural persistence (Goschke & Kuhl, 1996) 
qualifies those intentionsthat can be implemented in terms of activation of 
particular connections between execution conditions and action schemas. 
However, these actions cannot be considered automatic in the traditional 
sense in which the term "automatic" has been used in the literature (e.g. 
Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). Although they are directly triggered by the 
stimulus, these types of actions depend on prior formation of an intention 
and, hence, they are not uncontrolled but controlled in a specific way 
(Goschke & Kuhl, 1996, 55).  
The question of whether and, if so, in which extent retrieval processes 
underlying prospective memory can be distinguished by those underlying 
vigilance has not been systematically investigated. The present research is 
an initial attempt to explore this issue. 
Before describing the general hypothesis that guided our research, it is 
worth considering some differences between the paradigms commonly used 
to study prospective memory and those used to investigate vigilance. In a 
typical laboratory-based prospective memory task, the participant is required Prospective memory and vigilance  99
to perform a ongoing task (e.g., memorizing a list of words, generating 
associations among words etc.) while at the same time he/she has to 
remember to do an action at the appropriate moment (background task, e.g., 
pressing a particular key on the computer keyboard every 10 min or on the 
appearance of a particular item). That is, the paradigm usually takes the 
form of a dual-task, with a primary, ongoing task that serves as a covering 
task for the prospective, background task (e.g., Einstein & McDainel, 1990). 
On the contrary, in a typical vigilance task, participants are required to 
monitor an information source for the occurrence of a specified target-event 
(e.g., listen actively and detect infrequent target tones); in so doing they 
attend to only one source for a prolonged, unbroken period of time (see 
Parasuraman, 1985). Another important difference is that a failure to detect 
a target in a vigilance task is regarded as attentional in its nature, whereas a 
failure in a prospective memory task is commonly considered a memory 
lapse (Maylor, 1996).  
While prospective memory paradigms and classical vigilance 
paradigms differ markedly as to their structure, it is widely accepted that 
there is an element of vigilance in every prospective memory task (see e.g., 
Dobbs & Reeves, 1996; Maylor, 1996). That is, once the intention to 
perform an action in the future has been formed, it must be checked 
occasionally and monitoring for the target must occur. However, as Dobbs 
and Reeves (1996) recently pointed out, in a prospective memory task, 
monitoring is never a continuous process filling the retention interval. One 
forms the intention, and only occasionally makes a check of it. Typically, 
people participating in an event-based prospective memory task claim not to 
have checked their intention, but to have simply waited for the occurrence 
of the target (Brandimonte, Bisiacchi, Pelizzon, 2000; Brandimonte, 
Ferrante, Delbello, in preparation;  Brandimonte & Passolunghi, 1994). 
When monitoring becomes a continuous process, the prospective memory 
task may turn into a vigilance task. . In other words, we suggest that an 
important difference between prospective memory and vigilance processes 
may be that while the former requires retrieval the latter does not (see 
Logan, 1988). It is clearly difficult to decide upon an exact criterion for 
distinguishing between prospective memory and vigilance processes in a 
prospective memory task. However, we believe that this question is 
susceptible of empirical investigation.  
The assumption on which the present research is based is that in an 
event-based prospective memory task, once the action has been planned, the 
intention is no longer present in conscious awareness until the opportunity 
of performing the action occurs. In contrast, if people encode the 
background task as a vigilance task, the planned intention to respond to a   M.A. Brandimonte et al.  100 
stimulus whenever it occurs has to be continuously maintained in 
consciousness. If so, this should be reflected in the RTs in the ongoing task, 
with the vigilance conditions being slower than the prospective memory 
conditions. An inverse pattern of results should be expected on accuracy in 
the background task, as a consequence of the difficulty, in the prospective 
memory conditions, to reactivate the intention from time to time. In 
addition, if our hypothesis that in the prospective conditions participants do 
not maintain continuously the intention in an active state is correct, then 
performance in these conditions should not differ from that in the baseline 
condition in which the participants perform a single task (i.e., when the 
prospective memory task is absent). In two experiments, participants 
performed either a lexical decision task (Experiment 1) or a categorization 
task (Experiment 2). A stopping paradigm (see Logan, 1990; 1991) was 
used to investigate memory for the intention. That is, participants were 
required to stop performing the ongoing task whenever a particular target-
word appeared on the computer screen (background task). It should be 
noted, however, that the stopping paradigm used in the present research 
differs from traditional stopping paradigms (see e.g., Logan, 1988), in that 
in the latter a stop signal is commonly presented (e.g., a tone) which may 
occur at different delays after stimulus onset. In the present experiments, the 
same stimulus (the target) served as a stop signal so as to comply with the 
requirements of traditional event-based prospective memory paradigms in 
which the target stimulus serves as a cue which should prompt the action, 
without any other hint from the experimenter or the environment. 
The decision to use a stopping paradigm was motivated by the 
observation that prospective memory performance commonly implies 
performing an action that is different from the just-performed action in the 
ongoing task. It is virtually unkown whether and how the action the 
participant executes during the ongoing task interacts with the prospective 
memory action. Though not necessarily problematic for other experimental 
paradigms, this might be a problem for our task, given the subtle frame 
within which we explore possible differences between prospective memory 
and vigilance processes. The stopping paradigm avoids those problems in 
that the two tasks - the ongoing task and the background task - are in 
opposition. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
In this experiment, participants performed a lexical decision task - i. 
e., they had to decide whether or not a given letter string was a word or a 
non-word (ongoing task) while, at the same time, they had to remember to Prospective memory and vigilance  101
stop responding whenever a particular letter string appeared on the 
computer screen (background task). The "stop signals" were a word and a 
non-word, which appeared 4 times each. In order to induce prospective 
memory processing or vigilance processing of the two targets we 
manipulated instructions and training: one group of participants was given 
instructions and training intended to elicit prospective encoding (i.e., the 
target-word was not present among the items during training and no 
reminder of the previously formed intention was given); a second group of 
participants were induced to maintain sustained attention (i.e., during 
training the target-stimulus was present among the items and whenever 
participants failed to respond correctly they were reminded of the 
occurrence of the target). Finally, a control group performed only the 
ongoing task. Half the participants were presented with a target word and an 
illegal non-word while the other half were presented with the same target 
word as the first group and a legal non-word. Participants were required to 
perform the lexical decision task while at the same time they had to 
remember to stop responding whenever anyone of the two target-words 
appeared on the computer screen.  
According to our hypothesis, the vigilance conditions should show 
slower RTs in peerforming the ongoing task than the prospective memory 
conditions. However, accuracy in the background task conditions should 
show an inverse pattern of results, with performance in the prospective 
memory conditions being less accurate than performance in the vigilance 
conditions. In addition, according to our model, performance in the 
prospective memory conditions should not differ from the baseline 
condition. Finally, accuracy in the ongoing task should be equally high, 
irrespective of conditions. 
METHOD 
Participants One hundred participants took part in this experiment. 
Participants were assigned to three conditions: prospective memory, 
vigilance and baseline. In the prospective and vigilance conditions, 20 
participants were presented with a word and an illegal non-word target, and 
20 were presented with a word and a legal non-word target. In the baseline 
condition 20 participants performed only the lexical decision task.   
  Materials. The stimuli were two and three-syllable words and non-
words. The words were selected from the Bortolini, Tagliavini, and 
Zampolli (1972) norms for Italian language. They were chosen so as to be 
highly familiar (mean familiarity: 3.84 (max 4). Non-words were 
constructed by replacing two or three letters of each word and inverting the   M.A. Brandimonte et al.  102 
order of the remaining letters (e.g., canguro into cgsrntl). The legal non-
words were formed so as to be highly pronounceable. Within each 
condition, half the stimuli were words and half were non-words. In the 
prospective memory and vigilance conditions, one of the words and one of 
the non-words (either legal or illegal) served as stop signals. The targets 
were "cintura" ("belt", word) "naloci" (legal non-word) and "vrstcb" (illegal 
nonword). There were 48 items which appeared 4 times (i.e., each item 
appeared as many times as the targets). Thus, overall, there were 192 trials, 
8 of which were the targets that would serve as stop signals.  
Procedure. The stimuli were displayed in uppercase in the center of 
the screen of a Macintosh computer. Each stimulus was viewed at a distance 
of about 40cm and subtended 1.14 x 5.72ƒ of visual angle.  
Participants were tested individually in a session lasting about 20 
minutes. They were given written instructions specifying that they would be 
asked to decide whether or not each item was a word and to stop responding 
if the item was one of the targets. In the vigilance conditions, instructions 
stressed the double nature of the task (i.e., press the appropriate key on most 
occasions and stop responding on few occasions); following the most 
common procedure in the literature on prospective remembering, in the 
prospective memory conditions, the background task was embedded in the 
ongoingtask. Namely, participants were asked to perform the lexical 
decision task and, as a secondary task, they should remember to stop 
responding on appearance of the appropriate targets.  
In the training phase, participants performed the lexical decision task 
on 24 items which did not appear during test. In the vigilance condition, the 
two targets appeared two times each and if the participant failed to detect 
them he/she was given feedback and reminded to look for them. In the 
prospective memory condition, the targets never appeared during the 
training phase.  
In the test phase, all participants took part in the lexical decision task 
and had to stop responding on appearance of the targets. A fixation point 
was presented for 500msec., immediately followed by the stimulus which 
remained in view for 500msec., with an ISI of l.5 sec. and a RSI of 
500msec. Half the participants received the word and the legal non-word 
targets, and half received the word and the illegal non-word targets. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Reaction Times. A 3 (type of task; i.e., prospective, vigilance or 
baseline) by 3 (stimulus type; i.e.word, illegal non-word, legal non-word) by Prospective memory and vigilance  103
4 (number of presentations) mixed ANOVA on the median RT values in the 
lexical decision task showed a main effect of type of task, F (2, 97) = 8.99, 
p < .0003, MSe = 96093.51. Planned comparisons showed that performance 
in the prospective memory conditions differed significantly from that in the 
vigilance conditions, F (2, 97) = 10.05, p < .002, MSe =966026.25, while 
not differing from that in the baseline condition (Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Mean RT as a function of Type of task in Experiment 1 
 
There was also a main effect of stimulus type (word vs legal non-word 
vs illegal non-word):  median RTs were faster for words and illegal non-
words (570 msec and 574 msec, respectively) than for legal non-words (661 
msec), F (2, 194) = 200.59, p < .0001, MSe = 5673.36. A main effect of 
number of presentations, F (3, 291) = 18.99, p < .0001, MSe = 2688.86, and 
an interaction between stimulus type and number of presentations, F (6, 
582) = 5.75, p < .0001, MSe = 1154.17, were also found. The effect of 
number of presentations is due to the fact that repetition priming was 
observed across the four presentations. The interaction between stimulus 
type and number of presentations replicates previous results in the literature 
(Logan, 1990, 1991) showing that priming is stronger for legal non-words 
than for words and illegal non-words.  
Further analyses showed an interaction between type of target in the 
background task (legal vs illegal) and stimulus type in the ongoing task, F 
(2, 152) = 9.29, p < .0002, MSe = 5811.93. That is, RTs in the lexical 
decision task were affected by the type of target participants were 
responding to in the background task, with responses to illegal non-word 
being slower when the target of the background task was the illegal one 
rather than the legal one.  Errors were analysed for both the ongoing task   M.A. Brandimonte et al.  104 
and the background task. Errors in the background task were the main 
measure of interest. An ANOVA on the total number of errors in the 
prospective memory and vigilance conditions showed an effect of type of 
task, F (1, 78) = 11.55, p < .001, MSe = 5.002, with a lower error rate in the 
vigilance as compared to the prospective memory conditions. The effect was 
independent of the type of target (word, legal non-word, illegal non-word). 
Repetition priming was also observed on accuracy in the background 
task across the four presentations. An ANOVA on the number of errors in 
the first versus the fourth presentation showed a significant decrement as the 
number of presentation of the same target increased, F (1, 78) = 7.68, p < 
.007, MSe = .761. However, an interaction between type of task and number 
of presentations showed that repetition priming occurred for the prospective 
memory condition but not for the vigilance condition, F (1, 78) = 5.57, p < 
.02, MSe = .324 (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Mean number of errors in the background task as a function 
number of presentations (first versus fourth) and condition (prospective 
memory versus vigilance). 
To rule out the possible alternative explanation that the difference 
observed between prospective memory and vigilance conditions was due to 
differences in training, we run a further analysis by contrasting the first 4 
occurrences of the targets in the vigilance condition with the last four 
occurrences of the targets in the prospective condition. Indeed, if the 
difference in the number of errors in the background task was due to the fact 
that the participants assigned to the vigilance condition had already 
encountered the targets during training whereas the participants assigned to 
the prospective condition did not, then comparing the first four occurrences 
of the targets in the vigilance condition with the last four occurrences in the 
prospective condition should eliminate the difference. A 2 (type of task) by 
4 (position of the targets) ANOVA showed that the effect of type of task Prospective memory and vigilance  105
was still present, F (1, 78) = 5.42, p < .02, MSe = .133, with no interaction 
between task and position.  
Finally, we analyzed the number of errors in the ongoing task. Error 
rate was low, averaging 4% in all three conditions, implying that the 
difference in the error rates observed in the background task was not due to 
a trade-off between RTs in the ongoing task and accuracy in the background 
task. 
Taken together, the results of Experiment 1 support the hypothesis 
that, although there may be an element of vigilance in every PM task, 
performing an event-based PM task is different from performing a vigilance 
task. The difference we observed between prospective memory and 
vigilance conditions cannot be simply due to differences in the initial 
learning ofthe instructions and in the training phase. Rather, our results 
suggest that the observed differences can be plausibly attributed to the 
characteristics of the retrieval mode maintained by the cognitive system 
during the two types of task, with prospective memory relying more on 
spontaneous retrieval of the action on appearance of the targets and 
vigilance relying more on continuous monitoring for the targets. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Experiment 2 is essentially an attempt to replicate and extend the 
results of Experiment 1 by using a different task. Participants performed a 
living beings/non living beings decision task and again they had to stop 
responding whenever the PM target appeared on the computer screen. As in 
Experiment 1 each participant was presented with two PM targets that 
appeared four times each. In this experiment, at the end of the test phase, a 
brief questionnaire was administered which was aimed at getting 
information on the participant's awareness of the appearance of the targets. 
METHOD  
Participants One hundred participants took part in this experiment. 
They were assigned to three conditions: prospective memory, vigilance and 
baseline. In the prospective and vigilance conditions each participant was 
presented with a living being (either an animal or a vegetable) and a non-
living being targets. In the baseline condition all participants performed only 
the categorization task. The data from one of the participants assigned to the 
prospective condition and from one of those assigned to the baseline 
condition were not included in the analyses, because median RTs were   M.A. Brandimonte et al.  106 
higher than 1 sec. Thus, overall there were 98 participants: 40 in the 
prospective memory condition, 39 in the vigilance condition and 19 in the 
baseline condition. 
Materials. The stimuli were two and three-syllable words selected 
from the Bortolini, Tagliavini, and Zampolli (1972) norms for Italian 
language. Within each condition, half the stimuli were living beings and 
half were non-living beings. In the prospective memory and vigilance 
conditions, one of the living beings and one of the non-living beings (either 
an animal or a vegetable) served as stop signals. The targets were "lampada" 
(lamp) "canguro" (cangaroo) and "sedano" (celery). There were 48 items 
which appeared 4 times (i.e., each item appeared as many times as the 
targets). Thus, overall, there were 192 trials, 8 of which were the targets that 
would serve as stop signals. 
Procedure. Procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, with the 
exception that in this experiment categorization was used as an ongoing 
task. In addition, at the end of the test phase, participants were asked to fill a 
brief questionnaire, aimed at getting information on their awareness about 
the presence of the targets. Namely, participants were required to report: 1) 
whether they thought they made any error; 2) how many errors they thought 
they made; 3) whether and at which point in the test phase they were aware 
they made an error. This set of questions was repeated three times (i.e., for 
the ongoing task, for the living being target (either animal or vegetable) and 
for the non-living being target.  Results and discussion  
Reaction Times. A 3 (type of task; i.e., prospective, vigilance or 
baseline) by 2 (stimulus type; i.e., living beings/non living beings) by 4 
(number of presentations) mixed ANOVA on the median RT values in the 
categorization task showed a main effect of type of task, F (2, 95) = 7.10, p 
< .001, MSe = 45624.79. Once again, RTs in the categorization task under 
prospective memory conditions were faster than RTs under vigilance 
conditions, F (2, 95) = 6.40, p < .01, MSe = 292329.83. However, RTs 
under prospective memory conditions did not differ from RTs in the 
baseline condition. 
There was also a main effect of stimulus type (living vs non-living 
beings): median RTs were faster for living beings (639.80 msec) than for 
non-living beings (658.74 msec), F (1, 95) = 37.02, p < .0001, MSe = 
2186.33. There was a main effect of number of presentations, F (3, 285) = 
72.47, p < .0001, MSe = 1307.41. The effect of number of presentations is 
due to the fact that repetition priming was observed on RTs across the four 
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Errors. A one-way ANOVA on the total number of errors in the 
prospective memory and vigilance conditions showed an effect of type of 
task, F (1, 77) = 19.00, p < .0001, MSe = 3.94, with a lower error rate in the 
vigilance as compared to the prospective memory conditions. A 2 (type of 
task) by 2 (type of target) ANOVA on the number of errors for each target 
showed that the effect of task was independent of the type of target, in that 
the interaction was not significant.    Repetition priming was also observed 
on accuracy in the background task across the four presentations. An 
ANOVA showed a significant decline in the number of errors in the fourth 
presentation as compared to the first presentation of the target, F (1, 77) = 
21.16, p < .0001, MSe = .606. However, repetition priming occurred in the 
prospective memory condition but not in the vigilance condition, as 
qualified by an interaction between type of task and number of 
presentations, F (1, 77) = 5.69, p < .02, MSe = .279.     
As in Experiment 1, we contrasted the first 4 occurrences of the 
targets in the vigilance condition with the last four occurrences of the targets 
in the prospective condition to rule out the hypothesis that the difference in 
the number of errors in the background task was due differences in the 
training phase. A 2 (type of task) by 4 (position of the targets) ANOVA 
showed that the effect of type of task was still present, F (1, 77) = 9.33, p < 
.003, MSe = .288, with no interaction between task and position.    
The analysis on the number of errors in the ongoing task showed that 
error rate was low, averaging 3.5%, implying, once again, that the difference 
in the error rates observed in the background task was not due to a trade-off 
between speed in the ongoing task and accuracy in the background task. 
Finally, the results from the questionnaire showed that, when participants 
were questioned about their estimate of the errors they made in the 
background task, the percentage of "I was not aware I missed the target" 
responses was higher in the prospective memory (.19) than in the vigilance 
condition (.04). However, there was no difference between the two 
conditions when participants were asked about their errors in the ongoing 
task; i.e., no participants reported to have not been aware of making an error 
during the categorization task (.04 in the prospective memory condition and 
.0 in the vigilance condition). These outcomes are consistent with the notion 
that a fundamental difference between prospective memory and vigilance 
processes refers to the amount of monitoring that is required in order to 
detect the target.     M.A. Brandimonte et al.  108 
GENERAL DISCUSSION     
The assumption on which the present research was based is that in an 
event-based prospective memory task, once the action has been planned, the 
intention is no longer present in conscious awareness until the opportunity 
of performing the action occurs. In contrast, if people encode the 
background task as a vigilance task, the planned intention to respond to a 
stimulus whenever it occurs has to be continuously maintained in 
consciousness. The results of Experiment 1 support the hypothesis that, 
although there may be an element of vigilance in every PM task, performing 
an event-based PM task is different from performing a vigilance task. The 
difference we observed between prospective memory and vigilance 
conditions cannot be simply due to differences in the initial learning of the 
instructions and in the training phase. Rather, our results suggest that the 
observed differences can be plausibly attributed to the characteristics of the 
retrieval mode maintained by the cognitive system during the two types of 
task, with prospective memory relying more on spontaneous retrieval of the 
cue-action association on appearance of the targets and vigilance relying 
more on continuous monitoring for the targets. A stronger version of this 
view would be that whereas prospective memory requires retrieval of the 
intention, vigilance does not. Results from Experiment 2 allowed us to 
extend the above conclusions to a different task and to add some 
refinements to the picture emerging from this research. Once again, in the 
ongoing task, the vigilance conditions were slower than the prospective 
memory conditions. In the background task, performance in the prospective 
memory conditions was less accurate than performance in the vigilance 
conditions. The latter result was not due to a speed/accuracy trade-off 
between the two tasks (the ongoing and the background) because accuracy 
in the ongoing task was equally high, irrespective of conditions, nor to the 
differences in the training phase. In addition, performance in the prospective 
memory conditions did not differ from the baseline condition (i.e., when the 
prospective memory task was absent), suggesting that performing an event-
based prospective memory task does not elicit continuous conscious 
"rumination" of the intention, but rather relies on automatic retrieval of the 
cue-action association (McDaniel, Robinson-Riegler, & Einstein, 1998). 
The data from the post experimental questionnaire support this hypothesis. 
In fact, participants systematically reported to have been aware of making 
an error a) during the ongoing task and b) during the background task under 
vigilance conditions. However, most participants reported they never 
realized to have missed the target during the background task under 
prospective memory conditions. If one accepts the assumption that the 
ongoing task requires conscious recollection of the stimulus meaning to be Prospective memory and vigilance  109
performed, then the results from the questionnaire can be taken as indicating 
that event-based prospective memory retrieval plausibly relies on more 
automatic processing of the target (McDaniel et al., 1998). Recent research 
on the processes underlying prospective remembering specifically addressed 
the question of how event-based prospective memories are retrieved 
(Einstein & McDaniel, 1996; McDaniel et al., 1998). In particular, 
McDaniel and collaborators proposed a model of prospective memory 
retrieval in which the type of prospective memory tasks known as event-
based prospective memory tasks is aligned with direct associative episodic 
memory tasks (McDaniel et al., 1998). This model is based on the 
Moscovitch (1992a, 1992b; see also Moscovitch, Goshen-Gottstein, & 
Vriezen, 1994) systems theory of memory which holds that associative 
episodic memory tasks are mediated by a memory module that rapidly and 
mandatorily delivers to consciousness the information associated with the 
presented cue. The module is activated when the cue receives full conscious 
attention. If the cue automatically interacts with a memory trace (i.e., the 
intended action), then the product of that interaction  (i. e., the cue-action 
association) is obligatorily delivered to consciousness. If the cue does not 
interact with a memory trace, then the information is not retrieved unless 
another memory component (a prefrontal one, Moscovitch, 1992a, 1992b) 
initiates a strategic memory search (McDaniel et al., 1998). The idea is that 
it is this reflexive associative memory system that mediates prospective 
remembering, that supports retrieval of the intended action and that is 
responsible for those spontaneous memories that "pop into mind", 
apparently without any act of will. In the present research, the effects of 
repetition priming systematically observed on the error rate in the 
prospective memory task but not in the vigilance task add weight to the 
view that the retrieval of an intention under event-based prospective 
memory conditions is mostly automatic. Indeed, recent theories of 
automaticity consider repetition priming as a marker of automatization 
(Logan, 1988, 1991) and relate automatic processing to memorial aspects of 
attention, rather than to resource limitations (Craik, Govoni, Naveh-
Benjamin, & Anderson, 1996; Logan, 1988; 1991; Logan & Etherton, 1994; 
Logan, Taylor, & Etherton, 1996). For example, the Instance Theory of 
Automatization (ITA) proposedby Gordon Logan in 1988 is based on the 
assumption that automaticity is a memory phenomenon governed by the 
theoretical and empirical principles that govern memory (Logan, 1991, 347). 
Automaticity-as-memory theories account for the properties of automaticity 
in terms of the properties of memory retrieval, that is, it is suggested that the 
process underlying automatic processing is memory retrieval . The instance 
theory of automatization assumes that memory performance depends on the 
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memory process that retrieves past solutions. Performance becomes 
automatic when the memory process wins the race. In this theory, instances 
are separate representations of co-occurrences, they represent processing 
episodes. It is attention that determines what is an instance and which co-
occurrences are remembered. According to the ITA, repetition priming is 
viewed as the first step toward automatization. On the first exposure, the 
subject relies on some general algorithm. Obligatory encoding causes a 
representation of the item to be stored in memory; on the second exposure 
the subject can engage the algorithm or rely on memory retrieval of the 
episode: Whichever of the two processes finishes first determines 
performance. Repetition priming can be viewed as a shift from algorithmic 
processing on the first presentation to a mixture of algorithmic and memory-
based processing on the second, and so on till performance becomes fully 
automatic. Our data on repetition priming can therefore be interpreted as 
indicating that while some kind of automatization process is at work when 
people encode the task as a prospective memory task, this is not the case 
under  vigilance  conditions.    Taken together, the results from the present 
research are in good accordance with the hypothesis that prospective 
memory and vigilance processes differ as to the degree of monitoring that 
they require. However, it remains to be established whether "automaticity" 
can be considered a determinant of prospective memory retrieval. We 
believe that, although most results (including the present ones) seem to 
converge on this conclusion, one must be cautious before accepting the 
claim that automaticity is the major determinant of event-based prospective 
memory retrieval, as there are still some caveats that require attention and 
suggest that the picture may be more complex than commonly believed. For 
example, recent research addressed the issue of whether prospective 
memory retrieval is sensitive to interference from concurrent tasks (divided 
attention, Einstein, McDaniel, Smith, & Shaw, 1998; Marsh & Hicks, 1998; 
see also Hicks & Marsh, 2000; McDaniel & Einstein, 2000). Results 
showed that event-based memory can be susceptible to the effects of divided 
attention (Einstein, McDaniel, Smith, & Shaw, 1998), however, this is 
particularly true when the concurrent task is resource demanding (Marsh & 
Hicks, 1998). The conclusion is that event-based prospective memory may 
rely on both automatic and controlled processing, depending on the nature 
of the ongoing task and on its relation to the cue. Such a conclusion, 
however, is compelling only on the assumption that the detrimental effects 
of divided attention represent a reliable marker of controlled processing. In 
fact, while the common idea underlying resource theories is that 
automaticity does not suffer interference from concurrent tasks, 
automaticity-as-memory theories predict that automaticity, rather than being 
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memory retrieval (Logan, 1988, 1991). According to this view, the 
detrimental effects of divided attention on prospective remembering cannot 
be taken, per se, as reflecting the activity of controlled processing in 
prospective memory; rather, they might indicate that remembering an 
intention at some point in the future relies on retrieval-based automaticity. 
Automaticity-as-memory theories provide new and promising avenues for 
disentangling prospective memory from those cognitive processes (i.e., 
vigilance) which does not require retrieval to be completed. Such a 
hypothesis, which is currently under study in our laboratory (Brandimonte, 
Ferrante, & Delbello, in preparation), may open new directions for the study 
of the processes underlying memory for intentions.  
RESUMEN 
Disociación entre memoria prospectiva y procesos de vigilancia. En dos 
experimentos se explora si se puede distinguir entre los procesos de 
recuperación que subyacen a la memoria prospectiva basada en eventos y 
aquellos que son responsables de la vigilancia. Los sujetos realizaban una 
tarea de forma continua (decisión léxica en el Experimento 1 y 
categorización en el Experimento 2), pero al mismo tiempo (tarea de fondo) 
debían recordar que siempre que apareciese en la pantalla un determinado 
estímulo objetivo, debían dejar de realizar la tarea  continua. Había dos 
estímulos objetivo que aparecían 4 veces a lo largo de la tarea continua. 
Mediante las instrucciones y la práctica se inducía a los sujetos a codificar  
la tarea de fondo como una tarea prospectiva o como una tarea de vigilancia. 
Los resultados mostraron importantes diferencias entre memoria prospectiva 
y vigilancia. El tiempo de respuesta en la tarea continua fue 
sistemáticamente más lento en las condiciones de vigilancia que en las de 
memoria prospectiva. Sin embargo, las condiciones de memoria prospectiva 
no diferían de las de control (la tarea continua sola).  Los datos de precisión 
en la tarea de fondo fueron complementarios a los de tiempo de reacción ya 
que se observó un mayor número de errores en las condiciones prospectivas 
que en las de vigilancia Estas diferencias no se debieron a un intercambio de 
velocidad y precisión entre las tareas continua y de fondo ni tampoco a las 
diferencias en entrenamiento. Aún más importante fue que en las 
condiciones de memoria prospectiva se observaron efectos de facilitación 
(priming) a través de las cuatro repeticiones de los objetivos y que esto 
efectos no aparecieron en las condiciones de vigilancia. Estos resultados son 
consistentes con la hipótesis de que las tareas de memoria prospectiva 
basada en claves y las de vigilancia difieren en el grado en que requieren 
monitorización consciente. La memoria prospectiva depende más de la 
recuperación automática de la asociación clave-acción, mientras que la 
vigilancia depende de procesos de búsqueda activa del objetivo.  
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